A European Constitutional and Public Law Scholar by KUMAR, PRATYUSH
RDP, Brasília, Volume 18, n. 98, 414-441, mar./abr. 2021
Parte Geral
A European Constitutional and Public Law Scholar
M. Kotzur (Ed.), Peter Häberle on Constitutional Theory: Constitution as Culture and the Open Society of 
Constitutional Interpreters. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2018, 323 pp., €84.
PRATYUSH KUMAR
PhD Student, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy LLM, GW Law, USA pratyush.
kumar@uniupo.it; pkumar@law.gwu.edu.
Artigo Convidado
Professor Peter Häberle is among the most prominent constitutional 
and public law scholars in Europe today and this volume is the first full- 
-length book in English translating a selection of his works from German1. 
It will help integrate global debate on constitutionalism and generate new 
debates in constitutional and public law scholarship in the English-speaking 
world2. This is just the beginning of exploring his works whose corpus is huge 
running into thousands of pages (50 books, more than 150 major articles in 
leading law journals, originally in German), but also translated into Spanish, 
Italian3, Portuguese, French, Greek, Japanese, Korean, etc.
Path-breaking works are not only the articles translated – like the 1972 
conference on ‘Fundamental rights in the welfare state’ (Grundrechte im 
Leistungsstaat) debated in the German Association of Public Law Scholars 
– but also some very dense books since the PhD-thesis on the clause of 
‘Essential Content’ of fundamental rights in the German Basic Law (Die 
Wesensgehaltsgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 GG, 1961, 1983)4,  migrated 
into the Fundamental Rights Charter of the European Union, the academic 
habilitation treatise on public interest as a legal problem (Öffentliches 
Interesse als juristisches Problem, 1970, 2006), the first collection of essays on 
‘Constitution as a public process’ (Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozess, 1978, 
1996), the main theoretical work that conceives the ‘Doctrine of Constitution 
as Science of Culture’ (Verfassungslehre als Kulturwissenschaft, 1982, 1998), 
1 There are a few articles in English by Professor Häberle (1990-1991, 1994, 2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2007).
2 An analysis of his works is provided by: Luther (2002), Vosskuhle and Wischmeyer (2015), Posavec (2002), 
Hoffmann (2003), Amaral (2004), Azpitarte Sánchez (2003), Valadés (2006), van Ooyen and Möllers 
(2016), Hatajiri (2004), von Kim (1989), Blankenagel, Pernice, and Schulze-Fielitz (2004), Callejón (2004), 
Morlok (2001), Luther (2014).
3 Italian translations include: Häberle (2001).
4 Spanish Translation by Segado (2003).
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the studies on ‘Comparative Law in the Force Field of the Constitutional 
State’ (Rechtsvergleichung im Kraftfeld des Verfassungsstaates), the highly 
condensed theories on ‘European Constitutional Doctrine’ (Europäische 
VerfassungslPehre 2002, 2016); ‘The Cooperative Constitutional State – from 
Culture and as Culture: Preliminary Studies on a Universal Constitutional 
Doctrine’(Der kooperative Verfassungsstaat – aus Kultur und als Kultur: 
Vorstudien zu einer universalen Verfassungslehre, 2013), ‘Constitutional 
justice – Constitutional court procedure’ (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit – 
Verfassungsprozessrecht, 2014), ‘Comparative constitutional theory and 
constitutional practice: Last writings and discussions’ (Vergleichende 
Verfassungstheorie und Verfassungspraxis.: Letzte Schriften und 
Gespräche, 2016) and finally ‘The culture of peace – Subject of a universal 
constitutional doctrine’ (Die ‘Kultur des Friedens’ – Thema der universalen 
Verfassungslehre, 2017). Other smaller booklets examined topics of 
constitutional culture such as ‘The Image of Man within the Constitutional 
State’ (Das Menschenbild im Verfassungsstaat, 2008), ‘The Sunday as 
constitutional principle’ (Der Sonntag als Verfassungsprinzip, 2006), ‘National 
Flags: Civic Democratic Identity Elements and International Symbols for 
Recognition’ (Nationalflaggen: Bürgerdemokratische Identitätselemente und 
internationale Erkennungssymbole, 2008); ‘National anthems as elements of 
cultural identity of the Constitutional State’ (Nationalhymnen als kulturelle 
Identitätselemente des Verfassungsstaates, 2007); ‘The Memorial Culture in 
the Constitutional State’ (Die Erinnerungskultur im Verfassungsstaat, 2001), 
Pedagogical Letters to a Young Constitutional Lawyer (Pädagogische Briefe 
an einen jungen Verfassungsjuristen, 2010) and others.
Professor Häberle has marked the boundary between legislation 
and constitutional adjudication, on the one hand, and law and politics, on 
the other, as interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court (Kommers & 
Miller, 2012). He has often criticised the German Constitutional Court’s 
‘distinction between the will of the people and the will of the state as merely 
the nineteenth-century division between society and state parading in new 
and ill-fitting garb’, but he is one of the authors most welcomed and even 
quoted by constitutional judges (Collings, 2015). In 1983 he replaced 
Gerhard Leibholz in the direction of the German Yearbook of Public Law 
(Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts) until 2014. He is a very well-known and 
respected scholar all over Europe, but also in Latin America with seven 
doctorates honoris causa (among 24 worldwide awards), the highest badge 
of honour from Brazil, the Cruzeiro do Sul, many other decorations and 
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medals in Europe, scientific awards such as the Héctor-Fix-Zamudio-award 
for international scientific cooperation (Mexico City) or the Max Planck 
research award for scientific cooperation, among others5. At the University 
of St. Gallen where he was a permanent visiting professor, a Peter-Häberle- 
-Stiftung has been established (ibid.). In Granada and Brasilia ‘Häberle- 
-Institutes’, including libraries have been founded (ibid.). There was a pictorial 
biography released on his eightieth birthday in 2014 (Häberle, 2014).
The following pages offer a summary of the translated works that cover 
nearly five decades from 1972 to 2018. The purpose is to help to get access 
to a sort of German European Guru of constitutional thought that has a very 
original style and methodology. The way is an attempt of synthesis through 
relevant quotations with some explanations of the German and European 
contexts and some perspectives for an Indian reception.
The whole of these ideas can be read as a theoretical framework for 
the world of constitutions and constitutionalisms which allows his ideas 
to be fertilised in the Indian context. The topics start from the ‘German 
surrogate of social rights’ (1972) and the concept of ‘Open Society of 
Constitutional Interpreters’ (1975), moving towards a ‘Constitutional theory 
of human dignity’ (1987), and to a synthesis of Häberle’s cultural science-
based constitutional theory (2006), it then goes back to the interpretation of 
constitutional preambles (1979) and closes with an original contribution of 
the ‘Jurisprudence of European Law’ (2018).
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE WELFARE STATE
The first article in this volume is titled ‘Fundamental Rights in the 
Welfare State’ published originally in 1972 at the beginning of the first social 
democratic/liberal government of Germany6. In India the Anglo-Saxon 
terminology of ‘welfare state’ seems to be no longer fashionable but the 
ingredients of what the Germans traditionally call the social state (‘Sozialstaat’) 
or social rule of law (‘Sozialer Rechtsstaat’) are very much part of European 
social democracies and European constitutional imagination of EU rights 
regimes. The author begins his detailed report to the German Public Law 
Association with two contrasting statements, a liberal one on the principle 
of performance and a catholic one that ‘education does not qualify as a 
5 Included in the foreword by Kotzur (2018), note 6, p. 13.
6 Translated from German by Dr. Thomas Rittler (Attorney at Law). 
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consumer good’ (Kotzur, 2018, p. 17). The objective is to find a fundamental 
rights theory in the middle that is adequate to social market economy. His 
report is divided into two parts, the first part developing a conception of 
welfare state and its interdependency upon performance-oriented society 
and ends with the interdependency of state and society for fundamental 
rights. ‘Survey of doctrinal deficiencies with regard to fundamental rights 
with respect to welfare state activities concerning and having an impact on 
fundamental rights’ (ibid., p. 43). The second part develops a legal doctrine 
on fundamental rights in a social liberal state that formulates a two-side 
theory, the individual and the institutional components, of fundamental 
rights norms and pleases for a social ‘realistic’ understanding of them. The 
fulfilment of fundamental rights obligations is entrusted to welfare state- 
-related and public interest-related functions.
Welfare state legislation provides the ongoing welfare measures 
that aim to increase the effectiveness of the fundamental rights regime 
representing the normative aspirations of the citizens, on the one hand; and 
the state and its instrumentalities catching up to it, requiring a flexibility 
in executive function as one of its components. It also requires a new 
relationship between the legislative and executive powers of the state where 
mere ‘technicity’ of rules should not reduce the effectiveness of welfare state 
legislation.
He writes,
It becomes the legislator’s task to normatively ‘capture’ many of the welfare-
related relationships which have come into existence through ‘proliferation’ 
in welfare administration and to provide them with a solid – albeit ‘open’ 
– legal competence base, because: Welfare (law)-related relationships 
potentially qualify as relationships concerning fundamental rights. (ibid., 
p. 22)
Welfare-related measures are dependent on organisational and 
procedural acts for their implementation and only a planned welfare 
can resolve its conflicts with fundamental rights and other constitutional 
objectives. If the welfare acts (special action act, roadmap act, steering act, 
framework act) and controlling acts (organisational and procedural acts) are 
kept flexible to the extent, where as soon as there is a conflict with any 
fundamental rights it can reformulate and redesign its responses, there shall 
be greater optimisation of fundamental rights as a result of it.
Drawing from Heller’s theory, he defined Welfare State as,
RDP, Brasília, Volume 18, n. 98, 414-441, mar./abr. 2021
418    ................................................................................................................................... RDP Nº 98 – Mar-Abr/2021 – PARTE GERAL
Heller’s theory of the welfare state (Staatslehre) [state as organised 
human entity of decision and action, in which it comes to ‘exponentiated 
performance effects’, hence a kind of ‘value added through a welfare-oriented 
state’ – state does mean more than just a concerted action of a performance-
oriented society], ... Welfare state means a state constituted by the GG 
(Grundgesetz; German Basic Law), which directly or indirectly performs, 
through organisation and procedures, welfare benefits for citizens and social 
groups which – in the widest sense – imply a primarily positive relation to 
and impact on fundamental rights. Therefore, a welfare state is inconceivable 
without any application of fundamental rights in reality. The prerequisites 
and conditions of governmental provision of welfare are to be included in 
this context. The ideal-typical counterpart is the traditional state according to 
the rule of law and focused on order and intervention. (ibid., p. 31)
Keeping the limitations in state capacity, welfare functions have to 
encompass the economic, social and cultural aspects as a whole for an 
inclusive constitutional state where all citizens are stakeholders. On ideas 
of providing better educational infrastructure, support to even private 
educational institutions and provisions for free reading materials; Professor 
Häberle’s ideas resonate those of Professor Amartya Sen’s because both 
agree to these measures providing long-term dividends and specifically 
promote equality as a fundamental rights objective and a healthier and 
performance-oriented society7. In practice, also parental rights, freedom 
of conscience, human dignity and actually equal opportunities of pupils 
in the field of education benefit from the duty to provide subsidies (ibid., 
p. 57). Though the two might differ on the issue of welfare state turning into 
a complacency state which in turn reduces fundamental rights effectiveness. 
In the Indian condition, providing free grains to every poor rural household 
instead of ensuring sustained availability of agricultural work with legal 
enforcement of minimum wages has deepened the Indian agricultural crisis 
due to the resultant rural labour unavailability or shortages, or reduction 
in rural labour productivity; thus increasing agricultural cost of production, 
rise in agricultural prices, depeasantisation, excessive migration into cities 
with disease, malnutrition and urban poverty; resulting in a decrease in 
‘fundamental rights effectiveness’ as a whole. If the labour capital of a 
market becomes complacent it demolishes the groundwork for social market 
economy and reduces fundamental rights effectiveness.
7 For more, see Sen (2001, 2010, 2017).
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The author’s preference for flexible and liquid interpretation can be 
adapted even to the legal culture of fundamental rights in India. ‘In the interest 
of “securing further application of fundamental rights by interpretation” 
(“grundrechtssichernde Geltungsfortbildung”), the legal doctrine on funda- 
mental rights has to refine and keep flexible its systematisations, figures 
and instruments and avoid a premature binding to the written text’ (ibid., 
p. 48). This has been the silver lining of Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Article 21 (Right to life) of the Constitution of India that produced a ‘flexible 
judicial legislation’ in the entire environmental jurisprudence of the country8 
apart from reading it to include ‘fundamental right to education’9, ‘right to 
human dignity’10, ‘right to food’11, and even ‘right to sleep’12. Nevertheless, 
the openness of interpretation should not be confused with an invitation to 
judicial activism.
To develop a more dynamic ‘legal doctrine on fundamental rights’; he 
draws from Karl Popper’s open society thesis, on the ‘consequences of an 
“open” fundamental rights legal doctrine’,
In the welfare state under the GG, the fundamental rights set out a 
developing liberal overall status encompassing ‘state’ and ‘society’; they are 
structural constitutional guarantees... The ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare law’ 
component accrues to the fundamental rights nowadays. It needs freedom 
through the state, from the state and freedom to the state. (ibid., pp. 54-55)
The author revised the status theory developed by Georg Jellinek 
(negativus, positivus, passivus and the activus)13. He criticised the liberal 
dominance of status negativus and opposed a democratic view of status 
activus as basic status of participation in and within the welfare state. This 
status is developed into a ‘status activus processualis’ though procedural 
rights and produces the benefits to be distributed in the status positivus.
8 Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420 apart from series of M.C. Mehta cases. ‘This right 
encompasses wide variety of many other rights such as protection of wild life, forests, lakes, ancient 
monuments, fauna-flora, unpolluted air, protection from noise, air and water pollution, maintenance of 
ecological balance and sustainable development’ (cf. Singh & Shukla, 2016).
9 Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645.
10 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 177.
11 Interim order on: Monday, 23 July 2001. Retrieved from http://admin.indiaenviron mentportal.org.in/con- 
tent/order-supreme-court-india-regarding-issue-food-security-india-23072011; Final Judgement: 2007(1) 
SCC 719.
12 Ramlila Maidan Incident, re (2012) 5 SCC1.
13 See Alexy (2010).
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It is the result of an understanding of constitution, law and state which places 
a greater emphasis on the procedural side. The status activus processualis has 
to be assigned to the hitherto primarily substantive law status activus (status 
of participation in and within the welfare state). It means the embodiment of 
all norms and forms which regulate the procedural participation (including 
provisions on publicity) of the parties affected in their fundamental rights by 
the welfare state. (Alexy, 2010, p. 60)
This legal doctrine of a revised and re-effectualised fundamental rights 
system in the welfare state combined with earlier ideas of republicanism 
becomes the hall mark of the author because the ‘public power’ of the state 
today is its ‘welfare power’.
The logic of an efficient welfare state rests on an optimisation of all 
fundamental rights resulting in a ‘social state’ according to ‘rule of law’ 
because ‘fundamental rights qualify as social fundamental rights’ in a wider 
sense. He refers to this as practical socialisation and not nationalisation of 
freedom through fundamental rights which is a permanent and open process 
along with respecting private aspects of freedom. He provides ‘broad 
spreading of property’ as an example for it (ibid., p. 73).
The author links human dignity, social state and egalitarian democracy 
to the realisation or fulfilment of freedom (ibid., pp. 77-78). In order to realise 
social equality, rights protection has to move from a reservation of law to a 
reservation of procedure, for example, the right to worker’s participation and 
the right to education. ‘Every citizen must be able to develop and mature 
freely, otherwise, the res publica is not everyone’s cause’ (ibid., p. 91). 
The theory of the dual nature of fundamental rights that has been already 
developed by the PhD thesis of the author results to be supplemented by a 
welfare state element.
He raises a pertinent question on which would rest the edifice of 
the balance of fundamental rights in a welfare state: ‘Fundamental rights 
subject to the welfare state’s economic capacity’ or ‘welfare state subject 
to fundamental rights?’ (ibid., p. 96). The latter comes first but needs a 
realistic correction in the name of welfare rights limitations upon economic 
rights shall not be intensified in a manner which eliminates the incentive to 
perform and to produce the goods that could be redistributed. Concluding, 
‘Fundamental rights and welfare state are linked in a very “vulnerable” 
manner. Ultimately the welfare state is entrusted with the performance of its 
citizens in terms of fundamental rights’ (ibid., p. 128).
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THE OPEN SOCIETY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETERS
‘The open society of constitutional interpreters’ offers ‘A contribution 
to a pluralistic and “procedural” constitutional interpretation’14. The 
purpose was to free constitutional interpretation from being a hostage of 
a closed community (lawyers, judges, law professors) that admits only the 
two questions of ‘role and goals’ and ‘methods’. Adding a third question of 
who are the ‘participants of constitutional interpretation’ to be answered by 
a model of ‘open society of constitutional interpreters’ adapted from Karl 
Popper.
There shall never be an exhaustive list of constitutional interpreters. 
All citizens are entitled to participate to such interpretation and no one can 
be excluded from the process.
It can be defined as follows: whoever fills a norm with ‘life’ is equally involved 
in (co-)interpretation. Any update of a constitution (regardless by whom) is, at 
the very least, a piece of anticipated constitutional interpretation. ... Anyone 
who lives within the scope and with the circumstances governed by the 
norm is indirectly, and possibly directly, a norm interpreter. The addressee 
of norms is more strongly involved in its interpretation than is generally 
believed. (ibid., pp. 131-132)
Active citizens as public participants are a ‘must’ for any interpretation 
of constitutions. His example of religious freedom as interpreted by the self- 
-perception of churches and communities of faith and conviction (ibid., 
p. 132), is relevant in India for the ongoing vindication of the Hindu temples 
from government control over offerings. The Hindu ideas of religious 
freedom including administration of ‘religious money’ are relevant for the 
interpretation of religious freedom and need to be heard in all relevant 
procedures but cannot be ‘dictated’ to others because of the openness of the 
society of constitutional interpreters. The Hindu concept can be persuasive 
but any fundamentalism would breach the normative model of openness 
based on pluralism.
There are other German constitutional examples:
A similar relevance may be gained by the artists when interpreting the ‘open’ 
freedom of arts (Article 5 paragraph 3 Basic Law)15; even the pluralistic and 
14 Translated from German by Stefan Theil, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Bonavero Institute, Oxford University.
15 Article 5 paragraph 3 German Basic Law: ‘Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom 
of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.’
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process-orientated freedom of sciences, with its ‘open’ science terminology, 
raises the question as to what extent it must be interpreted by reference to 
individual sciences (and their metatheories) – how fundamental rights, in 
a specific sense, may be openly interpreted at all. In a wider sense, one 
may also mention the realities of orientating the interpretation of Articles 
21 and 38 Basic Law towards the modern party democracy, the theory of 
the occupational profile, the implementation of a wide (freedom of the) 
press terminology, or more specifically, to their ‘public function’, or the 
interpretation of freedom of association (Article 9 paragraph 3 Basic Law), 
so far as it shall consider the self-conception of those associating. (ibid., 
pp. 132-133)
The model offers a strong defence of the constitution and constitutional 
interpretation from populist critics who claim it to be away from the ‘political 
process’ and the ‘people’. ‘The political process is not a constitution-free 
zone; it pre-formulates topics, sets developments into motion which remain 
constitutionally relevant even where a constitutional-judicial interpreter 
later holds that the legislature is charged to settle this question within the 
boundaries of constitutional alternatives’ (ibid., p. 139).
The author provides a redefinition of the conception of people by 
considering the theory of identity of Rousseau to be dated. ‘People’ should 
not be a surrogate for the absolute monarch and how in a liberal democracy, 
a people is a coalition of citizens and every citizen is a constitutional 
interpreter making democracy to be a ‘rule of the citizens’, thus a ‘citizen’s 
democracy’ rather than an autocratic ‘people’s democracy’. To quote him,
As a constituted factor, a people operate universally, on many planes, on a 
multitude of occasions and in many forms, not least through the everyday 
application of fundamental rights. One ought not forget: a people is 
primarily a coalition of citizens. Democracy is ‘rule of the citizens’, not of 
a people in a Rousseauean sense. There is no way back to Rousseau. The 
citizen’s democracy is more realistic than the people’s democracy. ...  A 
citizen’s democracy is closer to a concept that views democracy from the 
perspective of fundamental rights, than to those in which the people have 
merely replaced the monarch as sovereign. This view is a consequence of the 
qualification of the populist term people, a term all too easily misunderstood. 
Fundamental freedoms (pluralism), not ‘the people’ thereby become the 
point of reference for a democratic constitution. This capitis diminution of 
the crypto-monarchical conception of a people is characterized by citizen’s 
freedoms and pluralism. (ibid., pp. 147-148)
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This view is apt in the Indian situation for illuminating the importance 
of both constitutional state and culture even if Indians are not yet frequent 
constitution readers. Citizens are asked to be interpreters of the constitutional 
values when exercising their rights and freedoms and these values need to 
be embedded and interpreted by all cultures. They are even relevant to 
cultural defence, that is first of all a moral supremacy over the left or right 
extremists and terrorists who cannot destroy the Indian constitutional state if 
it is backed by the pluralistic open society.
HUMAN DIGNITY AS FOUNDATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND THE POLITICAL 
COMMUNITY
In this essay16, the author identifies how human dignity is an enshrined 
constitutional principle through Art. 1 (1) Basic Law of the German 
Constitution but is not specific to it alone (ibid., p. 167). International law 
enshrines human dignity as one of its cherished principles through the UN 
Charter; UDHR Principles; Constitution of UNESCO; ICCPR; the preamble 
of the UN Convention against Torture, 1985; and Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 1989 (ibid., pp. 167-168). Human dignity clause got codified 
in the European constitutional law last but not least through Article 1 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 (ibid., 
pp. 168-169).
As far as the interpretation of the ‘actual constitutional text’ is 
concerned, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 already provided for human 
dignity clause and it proliferated after 1945 and 1989 for different German 
state constitutions due to its direct connection with the ‘principles of justice’ 
(ibid., p. 169).
Human dignity as a right to have rights is today a concept which 
encompasses other constitutional principles, areas and institutions to 
respect fundamental rights like right to personal privacy, or right to human 
friendly environment (Indian Supreme Court jurisprudence); political rights 
in liberal democracy (citizen’s democracy with fundamental rights and 
welfare state measures) as a ‘procedural consequence of human dignity’; 
labour movements (especially in the 19th century) as procedural guarantees 
of workers’ rights; mitigation of criminal law (issues of police atrocity, cruel 
punishment, torture); claims for personal respect in end of life provisions 
16 Translated from German by Katrin von Gierke; lawyer, lecturer, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law.
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(allowing passive euthanasia with or without advanced directives); protection 
against endless judicial delays; protection of the cultural rights of minorities 
including LGBT; and partial legal capacity of mentally ill or incompetent.
The concept of human dignity is the ‘paramount legal value’ of constitutional 
rule, ‘the highest constitutional value’. ... Professor Günther Dürig17’s ‘Object 
Theory’, based on the philosophy of Kant, is often cited: a human being is not 
a mere object of the state but rather his/her individuality is an aim in itself. 
(ibid., p. 177)
Giving the synthesis of the concept in the philosophies of the ‘age of 
enlightenment’,
In the Age of Enlightenment, dignity was viewed as freedom and linked to 
the stoical concept of participation in the ability to reason. Pufendorf adds 
the concept of human equality to the concept of dignity. This line of thought 
reaches its summit in Kant’s idea of the irreplaceability of each individual 
person. For Kant a human is only graced with ‘an absolute inner value’ 
(i.e. dignity) if he/she possesses a moral identity, a practical rational self- 
-responsibility and the ability to be autonomous. (ibid., p. 193)
Looking at Article 151 (1)18 of the Weimar Constitution and the 
diametrically opposite events of holocaust which followed, the concept is 
elaboration of a common trauma of humanity
Art. 151(1) WRV (Weimar Constitution) is an exemplary and logical 
expression of this development. Human dignity adopted legal form, achieving 
a breakthrough in creating a constitutional term. Its further development 
to a universal constitutional basis is, of course, also owed to the parallel 
negative historical events: the Nazis’ unprecedented disdain for humanity. 
These historical circumstances have led modern constitutional democracies 
to their present textual analyses and have morally guided the community 
of international states to their common acknowledgement of the concept of 
human dignity. (ibid., p. 193)
Human dignity is not a natural condition but the state must create 
conditions to achieve it (ibid., p. 195). What is also important for non- 
17 Famous early commentator of the German Basic Law.
18 Article 151 (1), Weimar Constitution: ‘The regulation of economic life must be compatible with the principles of 
justice, with the aim of attaining human conditions of existence for all. Within these limits the economic liberty of 
the individual is assured’ (Cf. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/ghi_wr_weimarconstitution_Eng.pdf)
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-European post-colonial societies like India is when the author acknowledges 
the cultural context of human dignity and human identity formation without 
discounting its universal attributes (ibid., pp. 199-203). Furthermore, human 
dignity as a concept with apparently stoic and ‘Eurasian’ roots is an essential 
precondition of the sovereignty of the people for a constitutional state 
guaranteeing ‘social constitutional government’, even a limited ‘cultural 
government’ or ‘environmental government’ (ibid., p. 206). Democratic 
sovereignty is just a procedural consequence of human dignity.
This reconsideration of the often-abused term ‘people’ in a cons- 
titutional state, is especially significant for a ‘modern’ constitutional state 
like India,
The term ‘People’ is defined not so much as a naturally but rather as a 
culturally pluralistic entity, specified by democratic, constitutional, and 
cultural aspects. It is comprised by individuals who hold fundamental 
rights: a ‘people’ is composed by the multitude of its ‘citoyens’. They are the 
‘sovereign’; they are ultimately the origin of all governmental authority. Thus, 
respect and protection of human dignity is a fundamental obligation (or more 
precisely an obligation of the fundamental rights) of a constitutional state. 
Thus Art. 1(1) BL constitutes a ‘form of government’: a justification of the 
state. Human dignity is the ultimate and the primary (!) foundation of popular 
sovereignty. ‘People’ is not a mystical entity, but rather a conglomerate of 
many individual ‘citoyens’ with their individual dignity. It is the compendium 
of a crowd of people, amassed in time and place, capable of further 
development, as accounted for in public life within Kant’s definition of 
natural law: the People, democratically governed, anchored in the principles 
of human dignity. ... From the vantage point of an individual citizen, human 
dignity and free democracy are interrelated. ... ‘The People’ oppose neither 
fundamental rights nor government, but rather are integrated in the structure 
of individual fundamental rights and the constitution. Fundamental rights 
also have a deeper meaning as ‘People’s rights’ (‘People’s freedoms’). (ibid., 
pp. 208-209)
Therefore, human dignity (as an outstanding goal of education) and 
fundamental freedoms on the one hand and liberal democracy on the other 
are interdependent and exclusive neither for Germany nor for any other 
constitutional democracy (ibid., pp. 210–212). The author has dealt in detail 
the human dignity concerns of artificial insemination, genetic modification, 
human dignity of children during the incarceration of their mothers, and the 
right to die in dignity under the German constitution (ibid., pp. 218-226).
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THE RATIONALE OF CONSTITUTIONS FROM A CULTURAL  SCIENCE VIEWPOINT
In ‘The rationale of constitutions from a cultural science viewpoint,’ 
the author explains in a self-reflective mode a ‘grand’ intellectual project 
suited for an academic in his twilight years19. ‘The text of the constitution 
alone cannot ensure a successful practice of constitutionalism in a state 
even when there is hope for ‘constitutionalism’ in international law and 
now a much-threatened pan-European concept of a ‘common European 
constitutional law’ (ibid., pp. 229-230). Legal and political culture matter 
for the understanding, use and outcome of constitutions’.
For tracing cultural science, he goes back to Roman antiquity starting 
from Cicero; to J. Burckhardt (‘Culture of Renaissance’); A. Gehlen (cultural 
anthropology); Max Weber (political culture); R. Smend (1928: ‘constitution 
and constitutional law’ scholar); H. Heller (1934: ‘fundamental rights as 
a cultural system’; ‘political science as constituting a cultural science’ is 
Staatslehre). Culture shall never come alone being nowadays differentiated 
at least in three forms e: (a) High cultures (truth, goodness and beauty); 
(b) Folk cultures (indigenous culture); and (c) Alternative (including even 
pornography) and subcultures, even countercultures (labour movements). 
The concept of culture should not be legally defined, but always include 
pluralism, conservation (customs) and innovation (creativity). The author 
outlines in this synthesis of his general constitutional theory the Italian 
contribution to constitutionalism from a cultural science viewpoint,
In Italy, the subject is particularly up-to-date and enjoys enduring appeal 
for a wide variety of reasons: the term ‘constitution’ is itself, of course, 
inconceivable without Italy. The Constitution of 1947 remains exemplary (for 
instance in Article 3 Sentence 220), in spite of, or indeed because of the on-
going constitutional amendments (as in the matter of ‘new regionalism’), and 
great constitutional scholars such as C. Mortati, V. Crisafulli or C. Esposito, to 
name only the departed, who have contributed much to this – our – subject 
decades ago. This, along with the special ‘genius loci’ of Rome and Amalfi, 
will do its part towards enriching our convention. (ibid., p. 230)
19 Originally published in 2006 as ‘Der Sinn von Verfassungen in kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht’ – translated 
from German by Stefan Theil, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Bonavero Institute, Oxford University (ibid., 
p. 229).
20 ‘It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the 
freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the effective 
participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country’ (Cf. Camera dei 
deputati, 2007).
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One implicit referral is to ancient Roman constitutionalism and the 
model of mixed constitutions during the Roman republic.
The legal positivist inventory of the elements of ‘constitutions’ opens 
with a preamble, followed by fundamental rights guarantees and state 
organisation followed by concluding and transitional provisions (ibid., 
p. 230). In the German understanding of constitutions,
A constitution has very specific functions: it not only limits and controls the 
exercise of power (through the judiciary), but also establishes and legitimises 
power (through elections). It constitutes procedures for the resolution of 
disputes (for instance through parliament), it divides areas of competence 
and organises institutions charged with determining and specifying particular 
tasks (along the three state functions) ... Constitutions establish a (cosmopoli- 
tan) social liberal state as ‘constitutional state of cooperation’ (Kooperativer 
Verfassungsstaat) (Art. 24 German Basic Law, Art. 11 Italian Constitution, 
Art. 49 Luxemburg Constitution) ... In their cultural constitutional law 
(‘Kulturverfassungsrecht’) constitutions – for instance through educational 
goals in schools – similarly promote a thin set of fundamental values that 
culturally ground an open society (such as tolerance, respect for human 
dignity, sincerity, democratic convictions and environmental consciousness). 
... When viewed on a timeline, a constitution is (also) a public process, in 
the sense that we can distinguish the following ‘sphere triad of the republic’ 
(‘republikanische Bereichstrias’): the sphere of the state organisation 
(‘Staatlich-Organisatorisch’) (of state entities, for example, through public 
hearings), the public sphere of society (‘Gesellschaftlich-Öffentlich’) (with 
trade unions, churches and the media) and the deeply personal private sphere 
(‘Höchstpersönlich-Privaten’) (with freedom of conscience). The public 
area is a ‘breeding ground for democracy’ (‘Quellgebiet der Demokratie’) 
(Martin Walser), although, ever since Hegel, we know that in the court of 
public opinion everything is concurrently ‘true and false’ (‘alles Wahre und 
Falsche’). First and foremost, however, a constitution is the embodiment of 
culture. (ibid., pp. 235-236)
The author has identified six elements of European legal culture 
(ibid., p. 239): (a) Its identity formed from 2,500 years of historical legal 
development and philosophical foundation starting from classical Greece 
and Rome (reminding us of Cicero) along with contributions from Christianity 
and Judaism; (b) Scholarship, the legal doctrine such as ‘condictio’ in era 
of Rome till middle ages refining further in the scholarship of Immanuel 
Kant and Max Weber; (c) Judicial independence with separation of powers; 
(d) Religious and ideological neutrality of the state; (e) Diversity and unity; 
and (f) Particularism and universalism of European legal culture. He also 
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explains and theorises the universal ‘culture in the constitutions’ (UNESCO 
Treaty, protection of cultural goods; European Cultural Convention, 1954; 
Art 3 para 1, Bavarian Constitution (1946): ‘Bavaria is a legal, cultural and 
social state’) and ‘constitutions as culture’ because it is an ‘expression of 
cultural development’ and even ‘the means to cultural self-representation 
of people.’ Cultures need constitutions and constitutions need cultures and 
this is a sort of ‘culturalist turn’ of the constitutional theory of Peter Häberle.
PREAMBLES IN THE TEXT AND CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONS
Häberle is perhaps the first constitutionalist to treat preambles 
seriously in developing a constitutional theory in his article ‘Preambles in 
the text and context of constitutions’ (‘Präambeln im Text und Kontext von 
Verfassungen’, 1979)21. In the German case of a commitment to reunification, 
the preamble was seen as providing a point of reference for the evaluation 
of a number of complex problems of the Basic Law: it was said to contain 
interpretational principles, that all pointed towards positive statements in 
the constitutional texts, or even provided decisive guidelines for future 
constitutional provisions (ibid., pp. 274-275).
The third sub-chapter on ‘Preambles between colloquial and legal 
language’ identifies three levels of language in the comparative language 
analysis of different preambles:
(1). The celebratory language, the ‘more than high-level language’, which 
can be identified through archaic, unconventionally used and festive style 
elements that seek to recall the celebratory, special circumstances of the 
birth, or rather the decree of Constitutions and their significance, (2). The 
plain language, which refers to the use of common words and terms, that 
appear to be ‘closer’ to the citizen, (3). The professional language, prevalent 
amongst lawyers, with its own terminology. (ibid., p. 276)
While explaining the objective of these three linguistic components 
of preambles, he comes back to premises of the open society of interpreters:
The objective of the celebratory language is to affirm and illustrate an 
identity defining order for the citizens and the political polity as a whole. 
The colloquial language style elements in a preamble intend to speak to the 
citizen not in the far and distant style of the celebratory language, but in 
everyday normality. The professional technical passages of a preamble finally 
21 Translated from German by Stefan Theil, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Bonavero Institute, Oxford University.
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express that the constitution is a legal fundamental order, representing the 
frame and the basis of all law in the polity and as such must be practically 
administered by lawyers. (ibid., p. 278)
In a constitutional theory analysis, he explains the functions of the 
preambles for constitutional culture:
Communication, integration and the possibility for identification (‘inter- 
nalisation’) for the citizens are the primary functions of constitutional 
preambles, thereby legitimising the constitutional state. To preambles, the 
citizen and not the lawyer is the point of contact. ... It shall be shortened 
here to the keywords: Constitution as legal fundamental order of the state 
and society; Constitution as a public process, as a framework for renewed 
harmony of citizens, of legitimacy, limitation and rationalisation of state as 
well as societal power, and as an expression of the cultural development of a 
People. This legal and cultural science understanding of constitutions proves 
itself specifically in the analysis of preambles. (ibid., pp. 279-280)
He goes on to add, ‘Preambles are thus an attempt to keep the 
Constitution “up to date”: between cultural heritage and future, between 
tradition and progress, etc. ...  preambles are therefore also an essence of 
the context of the Constitution’ (ibid.,  pp. 284-285). In his positive criteria 
for good preambles, the two examples he gives are the Preamble to the 
Constitution of India of 1949 and the ‘linguistic and content ideal’ preamble 
of A. Muschg for a private Swiss Constitutional Draft (1977) (ibid., p. 298). 
Concluding his conception for preambles, he provides an inventory for its 
codification and interpretation:
(1) Preambles as a ‘frame of reference’ seek to impose different duties on state 
functions, the citizens and the polity as such. It is therefore recommended 
to make use of preambles as a forum of responsibility: if not before God, 
then before conceived prestate premises. At the very least a kind of ‘self- 
-commitment’ of the public power and man, or rather the citizen should be 
formulated: a minimum of social ethics belongs here. (2) Preambles, much like 
the constitutions, stand in the area of conflict of the past, present and future 
and should therefore contemplate all three-time dimensions in a concise 
continuity. (3) Preamble should be a topical quintessence of a constitution 
and especially contain the important ‘principles’ (such as a commitment to 
human rights, to German or Irish unity, the European option), but not lose 
itself in details. (4) The content of preambles must be cast in an adequate 
form: following their specific function, aspects of the celebratory, but also 
of citizen orientation should be considered, through the use of all three 
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language levels: the celebratory, the everyday and the legal professional. The 
tone and ‘wording’ should be taken seriously. (ibid., pp. 299-300)
The preamble thus allows both functional differentiation and 
integration of languages and entrenchment of law and culture.
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EUROPEAN LAW: VIEWED AS A CULTURAL STUDY
‘The Jurisprudence of European Law – viewed as a Cultural Study’22 is 
the most recent and a characteristic miniature of the late works of the author. 
It offers a patchwork of own theory traditions and innovative ideas, an 
overview of his thought from ‘a historical triad of academic study: political 
science as cultural study (H. Heller, 1934), constitutional jurisprudence as a 
cultural study (my own work in 1982), and finally the study of European law 
as a cultural study...’ (ibid., p. 303).
After having initiated murderous colonial wars in the 19th century 
and two world wars, Europe, perceived as a peace project, a union of values 
and laws, was initiated through many partial steps. Examples are the Statute 
of the Council of Europe (1949), the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR, 1950) and the European Cultural Convention (1954, Preamble: 
‘European Culture’, Articles 1, 3 and 5: ‘the common cultural heritage of 
Europe’) (ibid., p. 305).
With the scars of the Second World War fresh in the memory of 
pioneers of the European project, there was a political and legal thrust for its 
unification, a ‘culture of peace’ and a ‘culture of constitutions and human 
rights’. Human memory being short and human behaviour being prone to 
repeating its own mistakes, there has to be a renewed thrust in the European 
project not just by Europeans but by non-Europeans alike. For questions of 
human dignity, fundamental rights, and social rights Europe seems to be 
today a Gandhian-moral exemplar and its success is important to keep the 
hopes of suffering, insulted and humiliated masses alive all over the world.
If one asks what is Europe’s union without a single written constitution 
and takes for the answer ‘European legal studies as cultural studies’, ‘the 
term Constitution does not only signify a legal structure for legal scholars to 
interpret according to their old and new techniques – it is of greater importance 
22 It is an original contribution to the volume and translated from German by Katrin von Gierke (Lawyer, Lecturer, 
University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law).
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as a guideline for legal laypeople: for citizens. A constitution is not merely 
a legal text or regulative guideline, but moreover also the expression of the 
status of cultural development, a tool for a cultural self-portrait of a people, 
a mirror of its cultural inheritance, a foundation of its aspirations. Living 
constitutions are opuses of all constitutional interpretations of open societies. 
They represent, both in form and content, far more than an expression and 
explanation of culture; they are the framework of cultural (re-)production 
and reception and a reservoir of inherited cultural ‘information’, experience, 
observation, and wisdom. Their cultural validity lies much deeper. This is 
best demonstrated in H. Heller’s portrayal from Goethe: a constitution is an 
‘established form which is actively developed’ (ibid., p. 313)’.
On the European preambles he remembers that many European 
preambles are an expression of hope for the future – even to the point of 
seeming utopian. Especially in this annus horribilis, this crisis year of 2016, 
we should especially be guided by these texts. Their key phrases are: human 
dignity, freedom, peace, constitutional government, democracy, prosperity 
and education, solidarity and fairness. (ibid., p. 316)
According to Häberle, even ‘proximity to its citizens, subsidiarity 
and solidarity as the guiding principles of EU must be upheld in order to 
ensure that it continues to be a community of peace, values and laws’ (ibid., 
p. 322). He stands firm by the ‘liberal-minded house of Europe’ and wants to 
decisively counter the ‘gorgon’s head of power as described by H. Kelsen’ 
with ‘a politics of peace (a culture of peace, the principle of peace)’ (ibid., 
p. 323).
He betrays his idealist hope for Europe, not just for Europeans but also 
for non-Europeans when he concludes with a sort of mission statement for 
the next generation of public lawyers:
A North-South gap between EU-member states or tensions between Eastern 
and Western Europe (Visegrád-states) must be prevented. We must promote 
the next generation of legal scholars, academics who have lived with the 
certainty of Europe’s cultural gifts, for example through academic exchanges 
and travel through Erasmus-Programs.
In light of globalization, the foundations of the ‘European house’ must be 
sturdy enough to endure and to promote exchange with other continents. 
Perhaps an impulse from the Europe of the Council of Europe and the OSCE 
will be successful (combining the principles in the Preamble of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Right, the EU, the Council of Europe, the European 
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Court of Justice, and the European Convention on Human Rights.) we need a 
European cultural initiative! (ibid., p. 323)
If one looks at today’s European Union in times of Brexit, some hopes 
are dying, but others are growing. The question is not only whether the old 
Europe can still claim to offer a heart to the new world order. The question 
is also, what can Europe learn from the other humanities.
ARE THERE POSSIBILITIES AND NEEDS FOR RECEPTION IN INDIA?23
The selection of texts that have been translated into English can be 
read not only in the North American and Anglo-Saxon-speaking new world. 
The purpose of the translation is to stimulate a worldwide cultural turn in 
constitutional studies and to help Indian constitutionalism to reflect its own 
cultural conditions. So, what could an Indian student tell Professor Häberle 
about the state of constitutionalism in his own country? Perhaps he could 
start with an interpretation of the first words of the constitution.
We could start with remarking that ‘India’, which is ‘invoked’ by the 
preamble of our constitution, has two official languages: Hindi and English. 
And the constitution is available in both, though it was originally drafted 
in English and the Constituent Assembly of India’s debates were mostly 
conducted in English and recorded in the same. It is interesting to note 
that, constitutionally speaking, India has two names: ‘India that is Bharat’ 
(Article 1, Constitution of India) (Parekh, 2015). Bharat and India are used 
synonymously. Both represent the landmass of the Indian sub-continent 
but they have different genealogical origins. India comes from Indus or 
Sindhu which is a river, the cradle of Indus Valley Civilization in India 
whereas Bharat comes from the legendary king Bharat, son of Dushyant and 
Shakuntala and grandson of Rishi Vishwamitra, also the plot of the famous 
epic-play by Mahakavi Kalidasa titled Abhijñānashākuntalam.
Even when we take the word ‘India’ because it comes from the name 
of the river ‘Indus’, it does have a deeply spiritual meaning. Rivers are 
spiritual-religious in the Indian subcontinent. Nature-worship is an important 
ingredient of folk culture of Hinduism and indeed all the Dharmic religions 
which have emerged from the sub-continent. And this finds its way in the 
23 In writing this section I have benefitted from discussions with Professor Jörg Luther, full professor of law, 
University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy.
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very use of term ‘India’ to denote the modern geographical-political entity of 
India. Words stay, and cannot be made devoid of its history and context. In 
all Hindu rituals, the ‘sapta-sindhus’ (the seven Sindhus, or the seven Induses) 
are invoked; so, without Sindhu or Indu there is no India or indeed there is 
no Hindu. The present-day republic of India has to be satisfied with six of 
the seven Sindhus. It is worth to be noted in this context, how it is spiritual 
environmentalism when the rivers ‘Ganga’ and ‘Yamuna’ were granted 
being living entity/juristic persona by the High Court of Uttarakhand24. It is 
around the same time when Whanganui river in New Zealand was declared 
a living entity (Roy, 2017). The High Court of Uttarakhand resembled ‘the 
people’, as ‘open interpreters of the constitution’, when it gave such a 
judgement. The ‘atman’ of the people became the ‘atman’ of the court. It 
would only be about time how this ‘spiritual environmentalism’ could be 
used to protect the fragile ecosystems of the Indian sub-continent. Despite 
continued destruction of pre-Islamic ideas of the people of Islamic state of 
Pakistan some forms of worship and good-luck charm coming from the river 
Indus still remains (Khalid, 2015).
In the present circumstances, the two names of ‘India’ that is ‘Bharat’ 
have also come to mean the divide between urban, English-educated elite 
and the rural, sometimes semi-feudal Hindi-speaking masses. It is also for 
this tension, that the Häberlean open society of constitutional interpreters 
becomes meaningful. The constitutional interpreters of India and Bharat 
today cannot just be the English-educated, urban, even urbane judges, 
lawyers, who ‘perform’ in the courts of law, or the political representatives 
who negotiate power in the ramparts of the parliament but also the vast 
mass of humanity who have started to think for themselves and assert their 
democratic rights through the ballot. The colonial and even postcolonial 
theoretical constructions do not fully convey the import and meanings of the 
aspirations of the largest democracy in the world also constituting the largest 
segment of young people full of energy and aspirations.
If there is a conflict between the meanings of constitutional terms 
in ‘English’ and in ‘Hindi’, what might prevail would depend on the 
stakeholders of constitutional interpreters because both are equally valid. 
And a plain reading suggests that often terms in English do not mean, or 
genealogically mean or are understood by the common masses as in its 
24 Though the order has been stayed by the Supreme Court of India (cf. Sinha, 2017).
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Hindi terminology. This requires a new legal lexicography as critics of 
western Indology have often pointed out that Sanskrit words (most words in 
Hindi and other Indian languages including Tamil have Sanskrit origin) have 
often been mistranslated, misrepresented and mischaracterised with the rise 
in colonialism and resultant racism, sometimes unknowingly and sometimes 
knowingly. In the human rights debate also, while discussing India it cannot 
be an issue of ‘resistance’, ‘resistance against what?’ The constitutional state 
of India? If human rights discourse has to succeed leading to empowerment 
of the poor and struggling masses it has to be within the confines of the Indian 
constitutional state and a respect for that constitutional state, rather than 
repeating a trite colonial-imbued and/or communist narrative of ‘resistance’ 
which immediately becomes suspect in the eyes of an Indian. Indians are not 
colonial ‘subjects’ of intellectual enquiry but are autonomous agents of their 
own intellectual articulations not hesitating to draw from the intellectual 
traditions of the former colonisers but on their own terms.
This is where the ideas of ‘open society of constitutional interpreters’ 
and the theory of the culture of ‘preambles’ become relevant25. Constitution 
has become a battleground for cultural clashes but also a meeting ground 
for the peaceful settlement of cultural clashes. It can only then emerge as 
a Dharma, a new Dharma built on thousands of years of Indian civilisation 
and intellectual work; to represent all its citizens and its pluralism, and their 
aspirations and meanings; and not just of a select elite.
Comparing the English and the Hindi text of the preamble, differences 
of meanings and conceptual understandings come to light.
‘Sovereign’ is closest to its Hindi equivalent, but with three words 
put together, ‘Sampurna Prabhutva-Sampanna’. Sovereign as a conceptual 
category is religious and godly in its origins of the state, and even for the 
modern state as a ‘march of God on earth’ in a Hegalian sense. ‘Prabhutva’ 
is Godly or Lordly or self-decisional or self-definitional and the prefix 
‘Sampurna’, which is also a compound word including ‘sam’ which would 
be ‘itself’ or ‘own-self’ and ‘purna’ or complete; therefore, it would mean 
its own complete self or one which decides or defines its own self, even 
its powers, functions and limitations becomes the ‘sampurna prabhutva’ 
or containing ‘sampurna prabhutva’. Going to the root of the word even 
25 The Preamble to the Constitution of India read with Fundamental Duties (Part IV A) as part of the larger 
Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) would lead to interesting interpretations of the Constitution of 
India. For more, see Singh (2016).
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further, the word prabhu comes from ‘bhu’ verb which means ‘to do’ or it 
could mean ‘the earth’, further defining the roots of the word ‘Samprabhutva’ 
meaning a ‘self-defining, self-limiting, sovereign’, and it would come to 
have a proto-spiritual meaning in its Indian context seen from the Hindi text. 
The third word in this compound is ‘sampanna’ which means bounteous or 
self-sufficient again reinforcing the autonomy of ‘samprabhutva’. Therefore, 
‘sovereign’ and ‘sampurna prabhutva-sampanna’ is nearly synonymous in 
both English and Hindi.
The term ‘ekta’ means unity, it is absolutely the same in both English 
and Hindi. The term ‘Akhandata’ in Hindi has been used for ‘Integrity’ in 
English. ‘Khandata’ means partition or breaking and ‘Akhandata’ means 
non-breaking or non-partitioning. It is a stronger conceptual term than its 
English counterpart where integrity of a nation remains despite some areas 
ceding from it or the very nation getting partitioned and the mother nation 
remains. ‘Akhandata’ on the other hand, means secession of territory from 
India or its partitioning is not possible under this conceptual term as part 
of the constitutional framework. After the colonial partitioning of India, a 
further breaking or partitioning cannot be constitutionally conceived, and 
it is more clear in its Hindi meaning. It can be the source of an ‘Indian 
nationalism’ as distinct and different from its European counterpart, despite 
modern nationalism being of European genealogical origins, because after 
all, had it not been for Indian nationalism as a counter to colonialism India 
would still be a colony which is an absolutely unacceptable proposition. 
Such a conception of ‘ekta’ and ‘akhandta’ is to be brought about by 
‘bandhuta’ or solidarity, and it could be interpreted as constitutional 
solidarity. The three conceptions of ‘ekta’, ‘akhandta’ and ‘bandhuta’ are 
‘samprikta’ or intertwined or interdependent on each other. It is also because 
the word ‘sunishchit’ is used to associate ‘bandhuta’ bringing about ‘ekta’ 
and ‘akhandata’. ‘Sunishchit’ comes from ‘nishchit’ meaning definitely or 
compulsorily; therefore, added with the prefix ‘su’ in the compound word 
would mean absolutely definitely (this meaning or sense can be expressed 
in Italian with ‘molto’ or ‘very’ or ‘absolutely’ in its English counterpart). 
Together this whole line in Hindi would mean ‘how solidarity or a 
constitutional solidarity’ has to absolutely and in definite terms ensure the 
unity and absolute territorial togetherness of India in perpetuity. Therefore, 
the ‘tukde tukde gang’ (those who aspire to break India into pieces) do not 
enjoy constitutional propriety. And freedom of speech and expression cannot 
warrant waging a war against the state and destroying the constitutional 
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regime which ensures such exercise of freedom of speech and expression. A 
parallel can be drawn with Article 5, Para 3 of the German Basic law which 
does allow ‘freedom to teach and research’ but in its second sentence makes 
it qualified that such a freedom does not release a person from ‘allegiance 
to the constitution’.
For ‘Secularism’ it writes, ‘Panth-nirpeksha’. The English secularism 
is absolutely clear and Western, even Christian in its theological origins 
whereas the Hindi word is an artificial construction by making a compound-
word with two words which still do not mean ‘secularism’ when translated. 
‘Panth’ means sect and ‘nirpeksha’ means non-identification, the closest 
English meaning would be to ‘not have a state religion’ or ‘state neutrality 
in matters of religion’. And this can be linked to the Indian cultural context 
by reading the inscriptions on the Ashokan pillars26 which do mean state-
neutrality and non-establishment but this alone is not secularism, which is 
what makes it such a contested conceptual category in Indian constitutional 
law as well as politics.
Socialism is more engrained in the Indian spiritual consciousness, 
despite the very political term socialism emerging out of its western political 
origin and due to India’s colonial contact, again not in its secularised format 
but in terms of ‘loksangraha’ or ‘serving or preserving the people’ of Srimad 
Bhagvad Gita. The term in the preamble in Hindi is called ‘Samajwad’; 
‘samaj’ literally means ‘society’ and ‘wad’ means ‘hood’ or ‘ism’, so 
together it would mean ‘society-hood’ or ‘society-ism’, then perhaps the 
cultural and spiritually inclined socialism of the Kibbutz in the early years 
of Israel might represent a comparable ideal of Indian socialism, which 
would be deeply cultural, religious in a spiritual sense and would have a 
compact society-hood. The idea was given its deep Indian theoretical and 
conceptual thrust by the writings of Acharya Narendra Dev (1946, 1956) 
and Achut Patwardhan (Singh, 1992), apart from influencing major Indian 
independence leaders like Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, Netaji Subhas 
Chandra Bose and Mahatma Gandhi27 himself. As against the majority of 
26 Nikam and McKeon (1959), ‘King Priyadarsi’s inculcation of Dharma has increased, beyond anything observed 
in many hundreds of years, abstention from killing animals and from cruelty to living beings, kindliness in 
human and family relations, respect for priests and ascetics and obedience to mother and father and elders… 
For instruction in Dharma is the best of actions.’
27 His idea of ‘trusteeship’ is his conceptual formulation for the Indian condition to reconcile ‘socialism’ in its 
modern garb with ‘liberalism’ on the one hand and India’s traditional forms of life and living on the other is a 
case in point. For more, see Gandhi (2011).
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communists who preferred to be guided by Moscow and Beijing, Indian 
socialists found their own footing even though they disintegrated as a united 
party, but their ideas dispersed through all parties and across the spectrum 
of left, centre or even indeed the right (Indian right is essentially a religious 
right and could be economically left).
‘Loktantratratmak’ is also a compound word with ‘Lok’ or people 
and ‘tantra’ meaning ‘levers’ or ‘mechanism’, so together it would mean 
‘levers of government or power resting with the people’, in other words, 
democracy. Democracy has deep roots in the Indian tradition from the times 
of the Lichchavi Republic (Mishra, 1962) and this is where both ‘east’ and 
‘west’ meet; ‘India’ and ‘Europe’ meet here in the most concrete conceptual 
terms. Due to this deep-rooted tradition of democracy in both India and 
Europe they have been able to develop and sustain modern democracies. 
Then comes ‘ganarajya’ for ‘republic’ which means the rule of the ganas; in 
the Lichchavi republic there were village and city councils called the sabhas 
and samitis which would elect representatives called the ganas, who would 
then elect its head. This is the nearest equivalent to a modern republic with 
an elected head of state, though the election is an indirect election like 
the election to elect the president of India, but an elected head of the state 
nevertheless, and therefore a republic. ‘Ganarajya’ and ‘republic’ mean the 
same.
Another contested terrain is Article 25(2), where the state can bring 
about social reform in the Hindu religion (which would include Hindus, 
Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs) and it got specially linked to the entry of the 
formerly untouchables (abolishment of untouchability under article 17 as a 
Fundamental Right) to Hindu religious places which were earlier not open 
to them. Untouchability is linked to the concept of ‘purity and pollution’ 
and it might still be practised. Someone who might practise untouchability 
in his household, even though constitutionally it has been banned, there 
is no allied criminal sanction making it an offence. SC/ST (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act covers any blatant act of violence or atrocity. It is a social 
practice also linked with the issue of hygiene and anyone who is performing 
a less-hygienic task like cleaning of toilets is treated as ‘untouchable’ all 
over the world so long as he performs that less-hygienic task. The problem 
occurs only if this becomes a stigma and carries over even when the person 
performing such an ‘untouchable’ task has already cleaned, washed and 
changed himself; like it becomes in India, and the person used to be and still 
to a large extent treated as untouchable if he is performing a less-hygienic 
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task, and if continued over generations it becomes an oppression, and a 
whole new social category in the form of an untouchable caste is created. 
This is also linked with the issue of ‘dignity of labour’, where ‘intellectual or 
Brahmanical labour’ is treated superior to ‘physical or manual labour’ and a 
less ‘ritualistically pure labour’ is considered inferior to a ‘more ritualistically 
pure labour’. The thousands of castes were essentially part of the fourfold 
varna and in its origins, it was not a matter of birth but of quality, so when 
the Dharmasastras defined ‘division of labour’, India was successful for 
several millennia but when it became a rigid ‘division of society’ it became 
a structure of oppression and an easy host to Islamic and then colonial 
invasion and destruction.
So, this would just be a first reading of the preamble of the bilingual 
Indian constitution. The two languages can generate different meanings and 
ambiguity, but the older and more national one and the other younger and 
more international allow to hold together traditions and innovations and to 
uphold pluralism through ‘dialoguers’.
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